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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
JOHN CHRISTY and KATHRYN 
E. CHRISTY, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EDWARD L. GUILD and MABEL 
C. GUILD, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants and Appellants 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This case "ra.s originally instituted in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City as, and we have a.ssu1ned that it 
remains, an action in unlawful detainer, seeking 
restitution of the premises described in the com .. 
plaint and damages for unlawful detention there-
of. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the 
defendants appealed to the District Court and de .. 
1nanded a trial by jury. 
'rhere is no dispute in the evidence as to the de-
linquencies of the defendants. It ·app·ears from 
the evidence that on January 24, 1935, a sales 
agreement of the premises was entered into between 
the p·arties. The defendants made a down pa.y .. 
ment of $20.00 and agreed to pay the balance of 
$3,180.00 in monthly installments. In said contract 
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defendants a.greed, in addition to paying the month-
ly installments, to erect certain imp~rovements and 
to pay taxes and fire insurance premiums. 
On January 16, 1940, the plaintiffs served notice on 
the defendants, intending to forfeit the contract, 
and, at that time, the defendants made a payment 
and promised to keep up the payments and that they 
would bring the contract up to date as soon as the 
defendant, Edward L. Guild, got a settlement from 
the Industrial Commission. (Tr. 12.2-3). The de-
fendants, on March 27, 1940, made an assignment 
of their ·contract to their son and daughter. (Tr. 
126-7). 
The defendants having failed to live up to their 
promises, the plaintiffs, on April 30, 1940, served 
notice on the defendants forfeiting the contract for 
failure to place upon the front of said premises a 
porch with a concrete foundation and fire brick 
upon the full length of the building located on the 
premises, and for failure to remodel and plaster 
with California stucco the rear of said building, 
for failure to p~ay the monthly installments due on 
the 1st days of January, February, March and April, 
1940, in the sum of $30.00 per month, and a balance 
of $10.00 for the installment due the 1st day of De-
cember, 1939, aggregating the total sum of $130.00, 
and for failure to p~ay taxes for the yea.rs 1935, 
1936, and 1938~ totalling the sum of $293.70, pluH 
interest, and insurance in the sum of $13.50. 
The testimony is \vithout dispute as to the fore .. 
going defaults on the part of the defendants. 
The defendants attempted, and now attempt, to 
overcome these defaults by making the following 
defenses and contentions: 
l. That. the plaintiffs had orally agreed to 
modify the contract 'vith the defendants, 
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because the permanent.improvements afore-
said were considered by the parties as un-
desirable. 
2. That the defendants had made pay1nent 
of the delinquent taxes and insurance, by 
virtue of defendants' note, Exhibit No. 2. 
3. That the defendants were entitled to 
equitable consideration because they had 
placed Yaluable improvements upon the 
premises, and that they had an equity in 
the premises because they had made pay-
ments over a period of time. 
~Phe foregoing propositions and their merits will 
be discussed under the headings above given . 
. ARGUMENT 
The Modification of a fVritten Contract Relati11rg 
to Real Estate j}ftttst Be in Writing and Sup-
ported By a Consideration 
The defendants, in their brief, assigned as error 
the granting by the trial court of plaintiffs' motion 
to strike the oral testimony given by the defendants 
to the effect that they had talked to the plaintiffs 
about the improvements to be erected upon the 
front and rear of the building located on said prem-
ises and that plaintiffs ag~reed with defendants that 
it would not be necessary for them to make such 
improvements called for in the contract. 
Under the law, a provision to forego the right to 
demand performance of a contract would be nudum 
pactum and void in the absence of any considera-
tion. A consideration is always necessary. Where 
a contract affecting real estate is in writing, any 
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modification of such contract must be in writing 
and supported by a ·considerat.ion. · 
The defendants failed to show a consideration for 
the modification of such contract and that such 
lnodifica tion 'vas in writing. In 
66 C. J., p. 728, it is stated: 
''In accordance with the general rules gov· 
erning modification of contracts, in order 
to render valid an agreement modifying a 
contract for sale of land, or substituting 
an entirely new contract in its place, there 
must be good and sufficient consideration 
and the contract must not be lacking in 
mutuality.'' 
In the same volume, at page 727, it is also stated: 
'' . . . Beeause of particular statutory pro-
visions (referring to the Rtatute of frauds), 
a written contract of sale of lands cannot 
be subsequently modifi~d by parol agree-
t " men ... 
See also 
80 A. L. R. 540. 
29 A. L. R. 1095. 
17 A. L. R. 14, 
holding that a contract required by a statute of 
frauds to be in "rriting cannot be subsequently 
1nodified by oral agreement. In 'the case of 
Combined Metals v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535; 
267 P. 1020, the Court stated: 
'''".,.hen the testimony of such additional 
oral agreement 'vas offered, Bastian's ob-
jections thereto 'vere overruled. We think 
the court erred in the ruling. The doctrine 
is familiar that when parties put their neg'O-
tiations into writing, in such terms as im-
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port a legal obligation, and on its face a 
completed contract, without any uncertain-
ty ns to the object or extent of the engage-
ment, it is conclusively presumed that the 
whole of the engagement of the PB:rties and 
the extent and manner of their undertaking 
have been reduced to w~iting, and that 
parol evidence is not admissible to vary or 
contradict the tenus of such writing or 
add or substitute new or different or a.ddi-
tjonal tern1s. !fcCornick v. Levy, 37 Utah 
134, 196 P. 669 ; Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 
148: 129 P. 365; l\{idgley v. Camp·bell Bldg. 
Co.,· 38 Utah 293, 112 P. 820; 2 Williston 
on Contracts, Sec. 633; 10 R. C. L. 1018; 
13 c. J. 771. ,, .... 
''Again, the original contract to be binding 
and enforceable, and to· satisfy the statute 
of frauds, was required to be, a.s it was, 
in writing and subscribed by the parties 
sought to be charged. To alter or modify 
any of its material parts or terms by a sub-
sequent agreement required one also to be 
in writing and so subscribed, especially 
the alleged agreement whereby Bastian, if 
successful in his litigation \vith Woolley, 
'vas to convey to plaintiffs an interest in 
and to the ranch in lieu of the bank stock 
and of the sugar company note. Lincoln 
Realty Co. v. Garden City, 94 Neb. 346, 143 
N. W. 230, Ann. Cass. 1914D, 342; Price 
v. McDowell, 52 Okl. 608, 153 P. 649 ; Notes 
L. R. A. 1917B, 141. Neither part p·er-
formance nor anything done by p~laintiffs 
in reliance on the subsequent agreements is 
n 11 eg;ed or nroven by them.'' 
Hogan v. Swaze, 65 Utah 380; 237 P. 1097. 
6 R. C. L., p. 915-18, ~ec. 298-301. 
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Unlawful Detainer is Purely a Statutory Proceed-
ing at Law, and Does Mot arnd Cannot Involve 
the Exercise of Equitable Ju1"isdiction 
The defendants complain and assign as error the 
trial court's refusal to allow the defendants to show 
that they had ren1odeled the building and made im-
provements at an alleged value of t\vo thousand 
dollars. These improvements were not ·called for 
in the contract bet\veen the parties. They were 
voluntary improvements made for defendants' own 
purposes which in no way could give them an equity. 
Drollinger v. Carson, 155 P. 923. 
Neither the alleged improvements nor any alleged 
equity the defendants might claim was subject to 
consideration in this action. The only issue in an 
unlawful detainer is the right of possession. The 
contract in this ·case p·rovides that in the event of 
the forfeiture of the contract for the purchasers' 
default in the performance thereof they shall he-
rome tenants at will; and, in this respect, it Is 
similar to the contract involved in 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137; 2·92 P. 206. 
In 26 C. J., p. 840, dealing with forcible 
entry and detainer, it is stated: 
'' . . . Since these actions are purely ac-
tions at law not involving the exercise of 
equitable jurisdiction~ unless there is spe-
cial statutory authority therefor, equitable 
dPfenses are not available in th·ese ac-
t . ,, lOllS ..• 
In Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304 ; 237 
P. 217, 
the defendant claimed that although he conveyed 
the premises in question, he "\\'as, nevertheless, the 
owner thereof, because he executed a deed to the 
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plaintiff through threats, frauds and duress, and 
the deed 'vas therefore void. The Court held that 
such proof 'vas inadmissible to sup,port said de· 
fense, and that the defendant's remedy was to in· 
stitute an action in a court of equity to determine 
his rights to the premises. 
The Court stated : 
"Proceedings under the forcib~e entry and 
detainer statute are in :a class by them-
selves. Such proceedings can generally 
be instituted in all inferior -courts and 
courts of special and limited jurisdiction,. 
and are intended to afford a speedy and 
!ldequate remedy to obtain the possession 
of real estate by the landlord against his 
tenant." . . . . 
". . . In 16 R. C. L. 1186, Sec. 708, it is 
clearly pointed out that in unlawful de-
tainer proceedings the tenant can only avail 
himself of the defenses that the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant does not exist 
by reason of the invalidity of the lease 
under 'vhich the landlord claims, or that 
there is no lease or contract to pay rent of 
. any kind, or that no rent is p~ast due. In 
some jurisdiction~, however, if it becomes 
necessary for the tenant to show tha.t for 
some adeauate equitable reason he should 
not pay the rent or be ousted from the 
premises he may enjoin the summary pro-
ceeding and bring an action in a court of 
general jurisdiction to test the equities and 
hold the summary proceeding in suspense 
until such action is determined. As a mat-
ter of course, in this jurisdiction the tenant 
may at any time institute an action in a 
· court of equity to determine his right~ k> 
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the premises in question. He may, how-
ever, not remain in possession of the 
premises as tenant and nevertheless dis-
pute the title of his landlord. And that 
is true in any kind of an action.'' In 
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398; 250 P. 
982, the Court stated: 
''The remedy or procedure available to a 
defendant in an unlawful detainer action, 
-'for the p~rotection and enforcement of any 
equity or right, he may have in the prem-
ises, is pointed out by this Court in Wil-
liams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304; 237 P. 217 
. . . ' ' In the ·Course of the opinion in 
that case, it is said: 
'In 16 R. C. L. 1186, Sec. 708, it is clearly 
pointed out that, in unla,vful detainer pro-
ceedings, the tenant can only avail himself 
of the defenses that the relationship of 
landlord and tenant does not exist by rea-
son of the invalidity of the lease under 
which the landlord claims, or that there is 
no• lease or contract to pay rent of any kind, 
or that no rent is past due.' 
"It is then pointed out that, in some juris-· 
dictions, whenever it becomes necessary 
for a tenant to show that there is an equit-
able reason 'vhy he Rhou]d not pay rent or 
be ousted from the premises, the tenant 
mav enjoin the summary proceeding by an 
action in a court of general jurisdjction to 
determine the equities and hold the sunl-
mary proceeding· in suspense until such 
action is determined.'' 
See also 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137; 292 P. 206. 
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lf the defendants felt that they had an equity in the 
premises, their remedy, as pointed out in the fore-
going cases, 'vas to file an action in equity to en-
join the unlawful detainer action brought by the 
plaintiffs, and if they were entitled to any equities, 
they would have been considered. 
The plaintiffs' action wa.s first filed in the City 
Court on May 23., 1940, and was appealed to the 
District Court by ihe defendants,. a.nd the case heard 
on September 13, 1940. There wa.s a period of four 
months in vlhich the defendants were afforded the 
opportunity to protect any alleged Equities they 
claimed by invoking the ex.ercise of equitable juris-
diction by a prop~er action. 
In their brief the defendants state that the ''only 
-3ign of equitable consideration given by the court 
may be found on pages 28 to 30 of the abstract,'' 
wherein the court gave the defendants a 'veek's 
time to pay the total amount due on the contract, 
plus attorneys' fees and costs. A reading of the 
record will definitely show that· the defendants 
themselves made the proposition of paying out the 
contract, attorneys' fees and costs, if the plaintiffs 
consented to give them a week's time in order to 
get the money. ~t\.fter plaintiffs' acceptance of the 
defendants' offer the court continued the case for 
one week and held the jury during all of that time 
to accommodate them. The ''equitable considera-
t·ion'' 'vas a proposition of settlem~nt between the 
parties and not the exercise of any equitable; power 
on th~ part of the court, as this 'vas a legal action 
under which the defendants deinanded a trial by 
,iury. (Tr. 155-8; 191). 
While 've believe the Utah cases, cited above, are 
sufficient authority on the question, "\\""e take the 
liberty of citing to the Court some cases from other 
jurisdietions illustrating this point. In 
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36 C. J., page 651, it is stated: 
''While it is held under some statutes that 
a summary p1roceeding by the landlord to 
dispossess his tenant cannot be enjoined 
or stayed by any writ from any court, it 
is generally held. that, in the absence of a 
statute to the contrary, a court of equity 
has jurisdiction to enjoin the proceedings. 
The court will exercise its jurisdiction in a 
·Case calling for the exercise of equ1table 
relief, as where the tenant is without an 
adequate remedy at law, where he has 
equities which he cannot assert in the sum-
d. '' mary procee 1ngs . . . . 
Phillips v. Port Townsend Lode, etc., 
(Wash.), 36 P. 476. 
Yukon Inv. Co. v. Crescent Mea.t Co., 
(Wash.), 248 P. 377. 
Peoples' lVIortgage Corp. v. "\\"ilton, (Mich.) 
208 N. W. 60. 
0 'Brien v. 0 'Brien, 195 Ill. App. 346. 
Aegerter v. Hayes (S. D.), 226 N. W. 345. 
Dysart v. Enslo,v, ( Okl.), 54 P. 550. 
The contract between the parties shows that the de-
fendants' down payment was $20.00. The evident 
consideration, as sho"\vn by the record, was that 
the defendants erect and make the permanent im-
provements to the front and back of the building, 
as sp·ecified in the contract, which improvements 
the defendants failed to make. Under these cir .. 
(;Umstances the defendants had no equity justifying 
an interference by a court of equity. The judg .. 
ment in this case, giving the plaintiffs possession 
of the premises, is not inequitable. 
Heard v. Gephart, (Kan.), 233 P. 1044. 
Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332; 135 P. 98. 
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The defendants stipulated at the trial that the rea-
sonable rental Yalue of the premises \Yas $75.00 per 
tnonth; the monthly payment under the contract 
·'-Vas $30.00 per month. The evidence further shows 
that the plaintiffs were very lenient "\\"ith the de-
fendants, and it is inconceivable how the defend-
ants c&ll clain1 that the plaintiffs dealt harshly with 
them, \Yhen it appears that they deliberately re-
fused to pay the installments, taxes, and insurance 
when they had on hand $1200.00 or $1300.00, re-
ceived from the Industrial Commission. We will 
say more on this subje-ct later in this brief. 
The Acceptance of the Defendants' Note, (Defend-
ants' Exhibit 2), By the Plaintiffs Did Not Con-
stitute Payment or Discharge the Debt, or Affect 
the Contractural Rights Between the Parties. 
Seemingly, the defendants' chief defense in this 
suit was based upon the theory that the taxes and 
insurance p·remiums had been paid by the defend~ 
ants by reason of plaintiffs' acceptance of Exhibit 
2 in the sum of $485.82, and, by virtue of such in ... 
strument, they "rere not delinquent in such item~. 
The terms stated on the note itself are a complete 
r.uswer to the defendants' contention. It specifi .. 
cally states that it is not in payment of delinquent 
payments due under the terms of the contract and 
does not in any \vay alter, modify, or chan,ge any 
of the conditions of ~aid contract. Referring to 
a part of said defendants' Exhibit 2, among other 
things, it reads as follo,vs: 
"It is expressly understood that it has no 
connection \vha tsoever with the contract, 
Y/herein \ve, the undersigned, are purchas-
1 np; from said payees certain real estate 
locat(\d in Salt I...~ake City, Utah, and this 
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note does not in any way alter, modify, 
or change any of the conditions set forth 
in said contract, nor is i.t in payment of de-
linquent payments due under the terms of 
said contract . . . . 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
E. L. GUILD, 
• MABEL GUILD'' 
In 21 R. C. L., Sec. 70, p. 70, on the sub-
ject of payment by note of debtor, it 
is stated: 
''The general rule is tha.t a note given by 
a debtor for a precedent debt will not be 
held to extinguish the debt, in the absence 
of an agreement to that effect, but will he 
considered as conditional payment or as 
collateral security, or as an acknowledge ... 
ment or memorandum of the amount ascer-
tained to be due . . . " 
In 48 C. J., page 610, it is stated: 
' ' The rule obtaining in most jurisdictions 
is that, in the absence of agreement or con-
sent to receive it as such, a draft or bill 
of exchange, although accepted by the 
dra.,vee, or a promissory note· of the debtor, 
or his acceptance of a draft or bill of 
exchange dra-\vn upon him, does not in it-
self constitute payment or amount to a dis-
charge of the debt . . . '' 
Similar contentions were made by the purchasers 
of certain real estate in the case of 
Malmstrom v. Second East Apartment Co., 
74 Utah ·206; 278 P. 811, wherein the 
Court stated: 
"It is claimed· that the plaintiff w,aived 
'vhatever rights he had under the for-
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feiture provisions of the contract by accept-
ing tlle note above Inentioned for soine of 
the installments and other iteins, by accept-
ing~ post-dated checks for son1e ot the pay-
ments at the conference had in l_\la.rch or 
April when the note was given, and by 
accepting payments throughout the period 
of Joseph Fargeson's possession after 
they were due. 'l,he defense of waiver was 
not set up in the pleadings in the case, 
and "\Ve might brush the question aside on 
that ground. But we prefer to dispose of 
it on the merits. The evidence upon the 
point, considered as a whole, d,oes not sup-
port the claim. In the first place, as to the 
note, the Gargesons failed to make the 
first payment provided for therein. While 
the acceptance of the note extended the 
time for payment of the items which it in-
cludes, it should not be held to constitute 
a waiver in case the Fargesons failed to 
pay the note. A seller does not waive his 
right to rescind the contract, or, as in this 
case, to recover possession of the property 
by granting to the purchaser an extension 
of time in which to make p~ayment, if th~ 
purchaser refuses to pay when the time 
fixed by the new agreement ha.s elapsed. 29 
Cyc. 1393; Machoid v. Farman, 14 Idaho 
258, 94 P. 170; Boulder & B. Placer Co. v. 
Maxwell, et al, 24 Colo. 87, 48 P. 815. 
. . . The impression made upon the mind 
of this writer by a reading.. of the entire 
record many times is that M~l1mstrom show-
ed a commendable spirit of forbearance 
to\vard the Fargesons all through his deal-
ings with them; but that he nevertheless in-
tended at all times to maintain all his 
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rights under the contract. It would cer-
tainly not be just for us to now say to him 
that, because he had been lenient toward 
his debtors, he had thereby lost his right 
to the possession of his own property to 
one "\vho failed or refused to make the pay-
ments stipulated in the contract." 
ln view of the express stipulations on the part of 
the defendants that the note did not constitute pay .. 
ment and did not in any way affect the contract in 
any manner, we cannot see any merit in the de-
fendants' contention that it w.a.s payment of the 
items claimed by them. 
r n the statement set forth at the outset of our brief, 
we pointed out that on January 18, 1940, the defend-
ants had been served with notices terminating the 
contra,ct upon the same grounds that tlie contract 
was finally tenninated, and we also pointed out 
that on March 27, 1940, the defendants assigned all 
their right, title and interest in said contract to 
their son and daughter, (of which assignment the 
plaintiffs ·were not notified). 
In the meantime the defendants made small sub .. 
Requent p1ayments and also made promises that 
they would pay up all delinquent payments as soon 
as Mr. Guild received a settlement from the Indus-
trial Commission, which settlerrlent amounted to 
$1200.00 or $1300.00. When this settlement was 
made with Mr. Guild, and before this suit was filed 
by the plaintiffs, the defendants tendered to the 
plaintiffs the sum of $130.00. Although, at that 
time, they were in default in the sum of $160.00, the 
defendants refused to pay the taxes, and the in~ 
surance premiums and urged the plaintiffs to bring 
suit against them on the note. It is a very appar-
ent fact that the defendants 'vere trying ~o defeat 
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the plaintiffs from collecting the items mentioned 
in the note by taking· the stand that the note was 
payment and, in vie'v of the assignment to their 
son and daughter, a judgment based on the note 
would be worthless and uncollectible. 
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs had not accepted Ex-
11ibit 2 as payment. In spite of this note, there were 
other grounds (which are set forth in the notices 
terminating the contract) which were ample fror 
forfeiting the same; that is, the failure to pay the 
monthly installments and their failure to ere-ct the 
jmprovements stipulated in the contract. Partial 
payments or offers to perform are unavailing. 
Cassiday v. Adamson, (Iowa), 224 N. W. 
508. 
Great \\T estern Inv. Co. v. Anderson, 
(Wash.), 297 P. 1087. 
It would be permissible for the defendants to prove, 
if they could, that they were not in default in the 
perfonnance of any of the covenants in the con-
tract which the plaintiffs have alle,g•ed they (the de-
fendants) were in default, and that they perfonned, 
or tendered performance, before the forfeiture of 
the contract. 
Great ''r estern Inv. Co. v. Anderson, 
(Wash.), 297 P. 1087. 
Dineen v. Olson, (Kan.), 85 P. 538. 
Haile v. Smith, (Cal.), 45 P. 872. 
Schubert v. Lowe, (Cal.), 223 P. 550. 
The evidence is undisputed that the defendants 
were in default in all of the items stated in the 
notices of forfeiture. 
There are several assignments of error that this 
Court should not consider. The assignments num-
bered 7, 8, and 10 are, according to numerous de-
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cis ions of the court, too general and indefinite ; be-
sides assignments of error, such as the assignments 
here numbered 7 and 10, merely attack the judg-
ment. The assignment of error numbered 9 should 
not be considered, for the reason that the objection 
thereby urged was not presented to or passed upon 
by the trial court, by pleading, as it might have 
been (White v. Century Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 28 
Utah 311, 78 P. 868; ·Busby v. Century Gold Min. 
Co., 2'7 Utah 231, 75 P. 725), nor was the question 
of the reasonableness or sufficiency of the notice 
of forfeiture, as to time, form, or otherwise, an 
issue litigated on the trial. These -are questions 
tltat cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 
Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah 334; 108 
P. 113.2. 
Summit County v. Gustaveson, 18 Utah 351; 
54 P. 977. 
We do not find that appellants have dis·cussed the 
7th or lOth assignments in their brief. 
As to the subject of the 8th assignment of ej~l or, 
viz., that ''the court erred in refusing to con::;ider 
the equitable issues presented by the pleadings,'' 
the appellants, in describing the contents of their 
answer, say, that they admit that they a.greed to 
make certain improvements, and the plaintiffs had, 
after execution of the contract, considered the im-
provements specified in the contract to be undesir-
able, and had waived the provisions of the con ... 
tract with respect thereto; and they say, that thP 
defendants had made improvements on the prop-
erty to the approximate cost and value of $2,000. 
The app,ella.nts further ·say: ''The evidence was in 
conflict as to the waiver of the contract require .. 
ments regarding the building of the front porch 
and stuccoing of the rear. The defendants offered 
proof to the effect that they had, since the exocu 
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tion of the contract, improved the property to the 
extent of $2,000." And, finally, they say, "''l'he 
pleadings disclose issues upon the following· ques-
tions: . . . ( 6) \\"']1ether in equity the court should 
declare a forfeiture of a contract for the purchase 
of a house and lot upon which more than one-third 
of the p~rincipal amount has been paid and where 
$2,000 in valuable improvements have been pla.Jed 
on the property. '' 
Disregarding the rule which prevails in this and a 
majority of the States, that equitable defenses arc..~ 
not admissible in actions of unlawful detainer, and 
assuming that the defendants have some equity, the 
latter does not exist by reason of the so-called im-
provements made by them. Even in California, 
where the courts recognize equitable defenses in 
actions for the recovery of possession of real prop-
erty, it has been held tha.t the making of such ltu 
provements is no defense, and in 
Haile v. Smith, 128 Cal. 415; 60 P. 1032, 
an action of ejectment by a vendor ag·ainst a de4 
faulting vendee, the Court said: 
''He (defendant) :received posse.s~ion of 
the land from respondent under the ·con-
tract, and can retain possession only by 
fulfilling his . covenants which he therein 
made. He cannot keep both the land and 
the purchase money. It is not necessary, 
therefore, for the purposes of this case, to 
determine definitely 'vhether or not re-
spondent had a good and sufficient title. If 
appellant desired to retain the possession_ 
'vhich he acquired under the contract, he 
should have comp,lied with his p·art of it. 
Whatever cause of action he may have for 
• 
the purchase money which he paid and for 
the value of his improvements is another 
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matter. .lt constitutes no defense to the 
present action.'' In 
Drollinger v. Carson, 97 Kan. 502;- 155 P. 
92'3, heretofore cited, the Court said: 
''The only basis for a claim that the judg-
ment is inequitable on the facts is a sh9w-
ing that the defendants had expended $900 
in the improvement of the property. Much 
of this expenditure - perhap~s $200 - was 
for items of ordinary rep~airs and main-
tenance, such as papering and painting, 
whic4 serve·d the purpose of the occupants 
as much as that of the owner. Some of 
it - possibly a greater amount - was for 
changes 'which would not necessarily add to 
the value of the real estate, at least in p1ro-.. 
portion to their cost, and which may not 
have been desired hy the plaintiff." 
And further : 
One who occupies land under a contract,. 
providing that he shall have the title upon 
completing the purchase price, but must 
give up the prop,erty if he makes default, 
has no absolute right with resp·ect to im-
provements he may make. His agreement 
gives him none, and the occup~ying -claim .. 
ant's act . . . does not apply, for he is not 
within its letter or spirit. 16 A. & E. 
Encycl. of L. 96. · The ordinary rule is that 
he is allo,ved no compensation for his better-
ments, although there are cases to the con-
trary. 16 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 97; ~9 Cyc. 
1401. Whatever concession is made to him 
in this regard must result from circum-
stances rendering it inequitable that he 
should lose his entire investment - a mat-
ter to he determined upon the facts of each 
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particular case. The trial court evidently 
concluded that, inasn1nch as the defendants 
had had the use of the property during 
the period of more than five years tha.t the 
contract had been in force, equity did not 
require any allowance to them on account 
of "~hat they had invested in permanent 
improvements. 
In Kansas, as in California, equitable defenses are 
admissible in unlawful detainer actions. In both 
States, it is settled that justices of the peace are 
without equitable jurisdiction or power, and an ac-
tion of forcible detainer must be determined as an 
action at law. 
Dineen v. Olson, 73 Kan. 379; 85 P. 538. 
Linder v. Warnock, 91 Kan. 272; 137 P. 
962; Ann. Cas. 1915C 314. 
Richmond v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 
62; 98 P. 57. 
Schubert v. Lowe, 1931 Cal. 291; 223 P. 
550. I 
In the Dineen case, it was held that ''for the pur-
pose of determining the right of possession, ques-
tions of title, legal or equitable, may be incidental-
ly considered;'' but that, ''if, outside of the ques-
tion of possession, he has rights concerning crops, 
improvements, or of any other nature, they can be 
adjusted in any app,ropriate pToceeding without 
embarrassment on account of this judgment, as it 
is not a bar to any after action brought by either 
party.'' However, the general rule in both States 
is, that if title, either legal or equitable, is involved; 
as in suits between vendor and vendee, growing out 
of a contract of sale, they must be tried in a court 
of general jurisdiction. 
Linder v. Warnock, supra. 
Richmond v. Superior Court, supra. 
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In an unlawful detainer action the only issue is the 
right of possession (Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 
304, 237 P. 217; Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 736, 
10 P. ( 2d) 323; Aegerter v. Hayes, 55 S. D. 337, 
226 N. W. 345; William Weisman Holding Co. v. 
1\tiller, 152 lVIinn. 320, 188 N. W. 732) and if other 
issues are injected into an action for the posses-
sion of real 'property, which at first was one of un-
la,wful detainer, it becomes an action in ejectment 
or to quiet title. 
Henderson v. Miglietta, 206 Cal. 125 ; 273 
P. 581. 
Thompson v. Reynolds,· 53 Utah 437; 174 
P. 164. 
And so, as was held in 
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398; 250 P. 
982, 
if there is any equitable reason why the tenant 
should not he ousted, he must institute an action in 
a court of general jurisdiction to determine the 
equities ; and, if he does, the Court can determine 
such questions as were determined in 
Croft v. Jensen. 86 Utah 13; 40 P. (2d) 198. 
But, in such a plenary action by the defendants here, 
we do not believe the question of their improve-
ments of the p·roperty involved would be of con-
sequence, especially in view of contract provision 
that in case of their default, any improvements 
made by them shall be· forfeited to the vendor. 
27 R. C. L., Sec. 428. 
66 c. J. 1050. 
Pillow v. M·cLean, (Tex. Civ. App .. ), 91 
s. w. (2d) 898. 
Chowchilla Col. Co. v. Thompson, 39 Cal. 
App. 517; 179 P. 411. In 
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Herpel v. Herpel, 162 Mich. 606; 127 N. W. 
763, 
the Court held, that "·here complainant sold land 
to defendant on monthly payments for the life of 
the complainant, and reserved a life estate, per-
manent improvements n1ade by defendant of his 
pwn accord "ill be presumed to have been made; 
for his own benefit, and so not to entitle him to 
credit therefor on such payments. And see 
Cent. Dig. Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 413. 
Dec. Dig. Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 201. 
And when the question of such imp~rovements is 
properly in issue, the inquiry relates to the extent 
to which the value of the p-roperty has been en-
hanced by the improvements, not the cost to the 
purchaser. 
Tyler v. Burgeson, 229 Mich. 2'68; 201 
N. W. 185. 
Collins v. Creason, 55 Or. 524; 106 P. 445. 
66 C. J. 796, Sees. 412-419. 
27 R .. · C. L.. 665, Par. 428. 
While the defendants allege that the provision of 
the contract as to building and remodeling porches 
was '' waivedj '' no facts showing such waiver are 
Plleged, and they ignore the rule that such provi-
sions are not the suhject of waiver. If the making 
of such improvements were dispensed with, it 
must have been by an agreement modifying the con-
tract in that respect ; and, as we have shown, such 
agreement must have been in writing and upon a 
sufficient consideration. The reason is, as stated in 
l\{cKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260; 24 
N. E. 458. 
8 L. R. A. 257; 17 Am. St. Rep. 638, 
"that it is not safe or prudent to permit 
the (written) ·contract to be modified or 
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changed by the testimony of witnesses as 
to the parol statements or agreements of 
parties. '' 
The distinction is between the contract itself and 
subsequent performance, 
Scheerschmidt v. Smith, 74 Minn. 224; 77 
N. W. 34, 
The appellant, Edward L. Guild, by his own testi· 
mony conclusively proves the default as to the im· 
provements. In reciting the conver.sation upon 
which appellants rely as a "\Vaiver of this provision, 
this appellant said: · 
"Vle told them "\Vhat we intended to do was 
to make a small porch at the entrance but 
not complete the porch as we had agreed . 
on in the first place. We did not do any-
thing with the porch.'' (Ab. 16-17; Tr. 116). 
So if we assume the claim of appellants as to a 
modification the testimony is conclusive that the 
1nodification, as proposed by appellants, was not 
complied with and the default as to this was 
complete. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case appellants went into the possession of 
the property of respondents, and had a right to re-
main in possession only so long a.s they complioo 
\\7ith the provisions of the contract under which 
they obtained possession. i 
The sole question is whether they were in default. 
BTandley v. Lewis, 92 P (2d) 338. 
The complaint sets forth a straight unlawful de-
tainer action. The answer) when shaken down to 
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the adn1issible elements of defense in this character 
of action, sets up two alleged defenses: 
1. That the default in the agreement to 
make in1prove1nents 'Yas "raived. 
2. That there ,,~at' no default of payments 
on tht~ con tract or of taxes or of insur~ 
ance premiums because a note was given. 
lt will be noticed that the right of re-possession in 
case of any of these four defaults is absolute in 
ihis agreement. The existence of all four defaults 
is established here bevond controversv and in such 
. ~ 
a ''Tay that the jury could not have found otherwise, 
and if so found, the court would have been called 
upon to set aside the verdict. 
The default as to improvements is admitted as 
above shown. The default of payment upon the 
agreement was so clear as to involve no question for 
the jury. 
Appellants relied upon a tender of $130.00, but ad-
mit that the default would have been in excess of 
this except for the note of $485.82. Now in addi· 
tion to the fact that the note itself recites tliat it 
:s not 
''in payment of delinquent payments due 
under the terms of said contract'' 
and, of course, no court or jury "\vould be permitted 
to find contrary to this expressed intention, appel· 
!ants make the contention that the pen notations on 
the note are part of the note, but the pen nota-
tions themselves show that no part of this $485.82 
was in any way related to the installment pay--
ments on this rontract. The pen notations further 
show included in this sum was $130.00 for lumber 
admittedly procured by respondents for app,ellants, 
~nd "rhen this $130.00 is deducted from the face of 
this note the $130.00 tender claimed was obviously 
insufficient. This is clear beyond dispute and is 
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decisive of this default, assuming everything that 
appellants claim with relation to this not~. 
Now as to the third default, that is on taxes, it is 
admitted the taxes "\\7 ere not paid other\vise than 
by giving the note, hut the parties agreed that the 
note "ras not a p~ayment. 
The note itself was never paid, nor ~-as the portion 
of the note relating to taxes paid, and the author-
ities hereinabove recited are conclusive that even 
under appellants' o"rn contention, this default 
therefore remains. 
What we have just said 'vith relation to taxes 
applies also to the default as to insurance. 
So that appellants, by their own agreements and 
their own defaults1 terminated their right to re-
main in possession of this property. 
The assignn1ents as to admission of testirnony be-
comes totally immaterial because the interior iru-
provements are nowhere involved in this case either 
by pleading or othenvise, and are exc] uded by the 
nature of the action. 
The other question as to an offer on accruing in-
stallments 'vas of no materiality because the only 
offer pleaded was the $130.00 hereinabove referred 
to. The question itself called for a conclusion. 
Appellants could not have been prejudiced by the 
striking of testimony as to modification, because 
their o·\\'"11 testimony sho,ved the default in that 
respect. 
The contention as to the court imposing attorneys' 
fees is totally immaterial. In the first place appel-
lants agreed to this suggestion by the court, (Tr. 
191) and in the second place no attorneys' fees are 
jmposed in the judgment appealed from. 
The contention that there was a question of fact as 
to whether payments on this contract applied to the 
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·current month or to the back payments is not "'ell 
taken. App·ellants themselves introduced Exhibit 
1 sho,Ying not only the application of these pay-
ments upon their contract, but also showing their 
default as to taxes and interest. 
Payn1ents, in the absence of an agreement, are pre-
sumed to be applied just as they were applied in 
this exhibit. 'rhere \Yas no evidence to the con-
trary, and as stated, the default as to these pa,y-
lnents was conclusive according to appellants' own 
testimony. 
There ''Tas no question of fact as to whether the 
note was given in payment of installments as con-
tended by appellants, because the note on its face 
and including the notations, which it is claimed by 
appellants should be included, show conclusively 
that it \Vas not to be applied, nor was any element 
of installment payments involved in it. 
There \Yas no question of intention on this note 
which could have been submitted to the jury, or on 
which any contrary findings could be sustained. 
The construction of these written documents was 
~~or the court. 
The other question which appellants suggest should 
have been submitted to the jury was the default in 
1naking the improvements, and as already shown, 
this default was admitted. 
The written exhibits in this case, controlling upon 
the parties here, are conclusive of the rights of the 
parties. There could have been no other determina-
tion in this case involving the sole question of right 
of possession, and the other incidental question of 
damages not argued by appellants. 
'Ve respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
H. G. MEtrOS, 
H. L. MULLINER, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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